Once upon a time, probably 1983, I had an idea to maximize diversity in a representative assembly. You vote for more than one candidate. The ballots are counted once for each seat. On each count one winner is chosen, and if you voted for that winner your ballot is discarded. A few years later (in an article by Hendrik Hertzberg in The New Republic‘s special on the bicentennial of the present Constitution, 1987) I read about the Single Transferable Vote, a much more elegant idea: don’t throw out the winning ballots, discount them so that their aggregate value is lessened by the number of votes needed to win one seat.
Once upon an other time, namely 1993, asked how to build a straight road without eminent domain and without being held up for extortionate prices by opportunistic holdouts, I suggested buying options on land until the optioned parcels include a useful path; holdouts would see offers decline rather than rising. A few months ago I read (was it in The Freeman?) that this is standard practice for pipelines. (2017: But how straight does a pipeline need to be?)
And once upon yet another time, circa 1984–7, I proposed funding public goods by conditional donations: by contract, the donors arrange to pay a specified fraction of the budget if and only if enough others make similar arrangements. Now I learn from Mike Linksvayer that this concept has a name – assurance contracts – and an improvement by Alex Tabarrok, dominant assurance contracts.
. . Speaking of voting, I see that a voting reform bill has been introduced in Congress. It would restore the States’ discretion (denied since 1967) to elect Representatives by proportional representation in multimember districts; likely some states will do so to reduce the decennial hassle of gerrymandering. The bill also requires the States to run “instant runoff” elections for federal offices; though instant runoff is fairer than plurality election (even with a conventional runoff), it is also onerous, and I don’t think it’s within the authority of Congress to require it – and thereby forbid approval voting which I like better still, partly because it is much simpler to operate.
Delegable proxy voting is one that I “invented” or perhaps just read about years ago. It’s so obvious I figure everyone who has thought about representative democracy at all has invented it. Upon being reminded, I’m now wondering about what effects dpv in lieu of a legislature would have on logrolling and rent seeking in general…
Above, my thought was that what is called “successive proxy” in the linked post is an obvious feature of dpv.
Legislature by proxy appears in The Probability Broach (or am I thinking of a sequel?).
Hey Anton, you might be interested in:
http://www.cs.wisc.edu/~liblit/pldi-2005/pldi-2005.pdf
some of the ideas are similar to your voting idea. They are interesting re coverage versus narrowing down failures ….
Over at Hit & Run there’s some discussion spinning from an essay by Jon Basil Utley at American Conservative arguing that political sclerosis is a predictable consequence of proportional representation, by which he means the party-list scheme.
Kragen Sitaker comments on this item. Kragen, by “Almost Invented Here” I mean that in some of these cases I had part of the idea but missed an important element.
Hello. And Bye.